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Should Presidents obey the law? And how about governors, mayors, admirals, sergeants, members of
Congress, police officers, and various other public officials? To many people, the answer to the question
is obviously “Yes,” but perhaps things are not so clear. At first blush it seems plain that elected and
appointed public officials ought to obey the law, and Senator Russell Feingold’s proposed censure of
President Bush for violating the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 19781 in authorizing the war-
rantless domestic surveillance of American citizens connects with the view that Presidents ought to obey
the law. But the obligation of Presidents and other officials to obey the law was not so plain to Abraham
Lincoln when in his First Inaugural Address he proposed flouting the Supreme Court’s Dred Scott deci-
sion2; nor was it to Franklin Roosevelt when he urged Congress to ignore court decisions invalidating
New Deal legislation3; nor was it to Bill Clinton when he led the United States (and NATO) into combat
in Kosovo in likely violation of international law4; nor was it to Mayor Ray Nagin of New Orleans when
in September 2005 he expressed outrage that the federal government had refused to violate the Posse
Comitatus Act5 by sending federal troops to assist in disaster relief in the absence of a request from the
Governor of Louisiana; nor was it to Fawn Hall, Oliver North’s secretary, when she testified during the
Iran-Contra investigation that “sometimes you have to go above the written law, I believe.”6 And nor was
it so clear to prominent non-governmental leaders like Arthur Sulzberger, the publisher of the New York
Times, when in February 2005 (and thereafter) he supported Judith Miller’s disregard of a federal sub-
poena; nor was it to Roger Toussaint, head of the New York City Transit Workers Union Local 100, when
in December 2005 he took his union out on strike against the Metropolitan Transit Authority in violation
of New York’s Taylor Law. And nor has it been to those who have criticized the judges who, prior to the
Civil War, persistently enforced a legally valid Fugitive Slave Law they believed to be wrong7; and those
who have similarly criticized the South African judges who refused in the performance of their official duties
to ignore the numerous laws that created and supported apartheid.8 And nor is it now to any admissions or
hiring officer at the University of California who would seek surreptitiously to circumvent the absolute pro-
hibition in California’s Proposition 209 on taking race into account in making such decisions.9
These examples are representative rather than exhaustive, and the American political tradition is replete
with instances of presidents, governors, cabinet officials, members of Congress, and countless less exalted
officials and leaders who have relatively shamelessly taken the position that immoral and at times simply
unwise laws and legal decisions need not be considered binding when they conflict with what those offi-
cials and their constituents believe is wise policy. And in taking that position these officials have situated
themselves within a post-Nuremburg tradition in which “I was just following the law” is hardly more of
a defense to morally wrongful official action than “I was just following orders.” 
My goal in this paper is to explore these issues, and with a two-pronged focus. One prong, which is espe-
cially timely these days, is to examine just what we mean by “the law” when we say, commonly, that we
expect presidents and other high government officials to obey the law. With increasing frequency,
Presidents and their allies from a wide variety of political perspectives claim that there is a big difference
between what “the law,” especially constitutional law, is, and what the courts, especially the Supreme
Court, say the law is. While there may be an obligation to obey the Constitution, it is said, there is no pres-
idential (or congressional) obligation to obey what the Supreme Court says the Constitution says10. The
courts are just one branch of government, so the argument goes, and accepting the obligation (whether
from the Oath of Office or otherwise) to follow the Constitution does not entail an obligation to follow the
Supreme Court’s understanding of the Constitution.11
So one task is that of attempting to sort out just what it means to follow the law12, especially in the con-
text of American constitutional law. But even if we can make sense out of this issue, there remains the
other prong of the analysis, the question whether there is, on the part of presidents and other officials
133
S
H
O
U
L
D
O
F
F
IC
IA
L
S
O
B
E
Y
T
H
E
L
A
W
?
and public leaders, an obligation to obey the law and an obliga-
tion to obey the Constitution. When breaking the law is morally
or politically problematic as well, it is often easy to chastise those
who do the wrong thing for breaking the law as well as being
wrong. So although we criticize Richard Nixon and his aides for
breaking the law, we would likely criticize them for their various
transgressions against democratic governance even were it not
illegal to steal documents from one’s political opponents, or
unlawful to deploy the audit power of the Internal Revenue
Service in the goal of punishing those who would dare to criti-
cize official authority. Accordingly, while we deploy the language of illegality against Nixon and others, it
is less than clear that breaking the law is doing the real work, and references to the illegality of unwise or
immoral official action may, once we see the widespread acceptance of illegality for wise and moral official
actions, be little more than piling on. So it is not at all clear that people believe that there is an official
obligation to obey the law qua law, and indeed many people appear to behave as if there is not. But if there
really is no obligation on the part of presidents to obey the law just because it is the law, then it is wrong
for an official to follow the law when the law commands what is wrong, and it is right for an official to
break the law in the service of higher moral or policy goals. An obligation to obey the law has real bite
when the law commands that which is wrong or prohibits that which is right, and from this perspective
it is far from clear, public opinion and political rhetoric aside, that the obligation to obey the law is an
unqualified good.13 And as the examples above illustrate, it is hardly clear, except as opportunistic politi-
cal rhetoric, that we really expect our political leaders to follow the law when following the law conflicts
with simply doing the right thing. So after examining just what it is to obey the law, with a particular focus
on the Constitution, I will turn to the question of whether there is, especially on the part of public offi-
cials, an obligation to obey the law at all and to obey that particularly important component of the law that
we call the Constitution.
I
There is no good order for this inquiry. If we commence with the question of official obligation to obey
the law, we fall quickly into confronting the question of just what law, if any, an official is expected to obey.
And if we start with trying to trying to understand what the law is for these purposes, we discover that
even that question is inextricably tied to the question of obedience. Still, the latter course is somewhat
cleaner, and thus it is best first to approach the definitional question.
The definitional question is important precisely because, in the context of official obligation to the law, a
primary (but not the only) legal item of relevance is the Constitution.14 Yet when we think about official
obligation to obey the Constitution, it turns out that in the overwhelming proportion of cases, the bare
text of the document is of little assistance.15 It is true that a President who initiated and managed a pros-
ecution for treason with only one witness against the defendant would be in explicit violation of the con-
stitutional requirement (in Article III, Section 3) that there be two witnesses against the defendant in any
trial for treason, as would a President, slightly more plausibly, who attempted to run for a third term in
violation of the Twenty-Second Amendment. Yet although the text is plain in such cases, the words of the
document are not nearly so helpful for most of the other issues to which the Constitution appears to
apply, and to almost all of the issues that provide the basis for actual constitutional controversies. A
Congress which wished to prohibit affirmative action in all federal programs could non-laughably draw
some support the requirement in the Fourteenth Amendment that the states guarantee the “equal pro-
tection of the laws,” but so too could a Congress which wished to expand and vigorously support such
programs. Similarly, both sides of the contemporary controversies about a journalist’s privilege (and its
“So it is not at all clear that people 
believe that there is an official 
obligation to obey the law qua law, 
and indeed many people appear 
to behave as if there is not.”
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argued constitutional basis) to refuse to disclose confidential sources could rely on the skimpy words of
the First Amendment, as could both sides of disputes about campaign finance reform, child pornogra-
phy, flag desecration, and numerous other free speech and free press issues. The First Amendment’s pro-
hibition on the “establishment” of religion might or might not ban prayer in the public schools (or
government financial assistance to religious schools); the reference to “liberty” in the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments could or could not protect the right of a woman to have an abortion; and the
limitation of federal action, normally, to “commerce among the several states” might or might not allow
Congress and the President to regulate racial discrimination in hotels and restaurants, guns in schools,
and the wages that states and their subdivisions pay to their employees. For all of these controversies, and
countless others, it is a characteristic (and, arguably, unique16 ) feature of the American Constitution that
the constitutional text is so indeterminate as to plausibly support either side of the debate.17
The upshot of this is that in terms of the question of official obedience to the Constitution, almost all of
“the action,” as it were, surrounds the question whether a President or any other non-judicial official
should obey—treat as authoritative18—Supreme Court interpretations of the constitutional text. A
President who wished to prosecute people for burning the American flag could rely on the indetermina-
cy of the constitutional text to support his action, and could rely as well on history, for nothing in the orig-
inal intentions of the drafters and little in actual practice from 1791 to the 1960s would suggest that the
First Amendment stands as a barrier to such action. But whatever the lessons from the text or history, it
is plain that the Supreme Court, first in 198919, and then again a year later20, has interpreted the First
Amendment to prohibit state and federal prosecutions for desecrating the American flag. A President
who wished to initiate such a prosecution might be able to draw some support from the text, and much
support from history, but it would be clear that he was directly contravening the Supreme Court’s under-
standing of the Constitution. So too with a President who wished, again with plausible support from text
and history, to propose a federal statute outlawing abortion21, or homosexual sodomy22, or the advertise-
ment of cigarettes and alcohol23, or the spending of more than a nominal amount on television advertis-
ing in congressional elections24, or the mailing of indecent but not obscene literature25, or requiring that
a set percentage of minorities be hired in federal agencies.26 In each of these cases plausibly contestable
questions of deep constitutional meaning have been addressed and resolved27 by the Supreme Court, and
a President who proposed any such action would be squarely at odds with the Supreme Court’s continu-
ing28 understanding of the Constitution.
It is in such cases that most of the controversies about presidential obedience to the Constitution have
arisen. When Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation directly contradicted the Dred Scott decision29,
Lincoln did not claim that he was violating the Constitution—he claimed only that he preferred his own
interpretation of the Constitution to the Supreme Court’s, and that with respect to his own actions he
would go with his own interpretation of the Constitution. Lincoln’s position is thus similar to the posi-
tion taken by Roosevelt in urging Congress to pass that New Deal legislation it thought wise and consti-
tutional30, potential Supreme Court invalidation notwithstanding, to the position urged by Attorney
General Edwin Meese in 1985 when he opined that the states were free to disregard Supreme Court opin-
ions regarding school prayer and abortion save in the very cases in which the decision had been reached31,
to the position taken by Congress32 in attempting to undercut the Supreme Court’s ruling in Miranda v.
Arizona.33 And Lincoln’s position is of course quite similar to the position of the Bush Administration
regarding numerous aspects of emergency and national defense powers, for in such instances the Bush
Administration is claiming that their actions are at least consistent with and arguably commanded
by their understanding of, inter alia, the Commander in Chief power in Article II, Section 2
of the Constitution. 
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At least in the American context, presidential insistence on the right to their own constitutional inter-
pretations, the Supreme Court’s views notwithstanding, is assisted in part by the absence of explicit
authorization in the text for the very power of judicial review34, and even more by a view of separation of
powers in which the power to interpret the Constitution is central to the activities of all branches and
nowhere exclusively delegated to the courts. The Supreme Court might have the power to interpret the
Constitution for its own purposes, so the argument goes, but so too do the other departments, and the
Supreme Court no more has the power to interpret the Constitution for the President than the President
has to interpret it for the Supreme Court.
Not all questions about presidential obedience to the law surround this question of judicial interpretive
supremacy (or not) regarding the Constitution. Sometimes the questions involve Presidents disregarding
statutes that they believe to be unconstitutional even though there has never been a judicial ruling, as for
example with the statements of Presidents from both parties from Nixon to the present as to the possible
or likely unconstitutionality of the War Powers Resolution. And sometimes the questions and controver-
sies involve the even more direct claim that some statute must be disregarded because of the demands of
the higher moral and social good, which is what Fawn Hall is best understood as arguing in the Iran-
Contra hearings, and what Roger Toussaint explicitly argued in the context of his union’s disregard of
New York’s Taylor Law. But most often the question is about Supreme Court interpretations of the
Constitution, and thus about the question whether the President must obey such interpretations when
he believes them to be mistaken as interpretations. And it is to that question that I now turn. 
I I
Much ink has been spilled over the question whether there is a moral obligation to obey the law. And the
question is an interesting and important one only when the law commands what its addressee otherwise
believes to be wrong. It is true that it is illegal to kill, to rape, to steal, to sell heroin, and to buy and sell
stocks on the basis of inside information known to one party but not to the other. But it is also true that
it would be wrong to engage in any of these activities even were they not illegal. Law provides the penal-
ty for morally wrong activities35, but the person considering whether to rape or steal ought not to get to
the question whether such activities happen to be illegal. It is only when the law requires that which
would be immoral (as with many of the Nazi laws) or prohibits that which would be morally obligatory
(as with Lincoln’s freeing of the slaves, and as with many of the prohibitions of the South African
apartheid laws) does the true question of a moral obligation to obey the law arise, for only in such cases
is the issue of legal command relevant to the morally motivated agent.
From Plato36 to Rawls37, theorists have argued that there is indeed a moral obligation to obey the law, and
to those theorists there is a (prima facie) obligation on the part of citizens to follow even morally erro-
neous legal directives. But at least for the past thirty-five years, other theorists have argued that there is
no such obligation, and that various arguments from social contract, from consent, from fair play, and
from cooperation and coordination, among others, are ultimately unsound.38 They have argued that the
moral obligations of the moral agent are simply to do the morally right thing, law’s occasionally (or fre-
quently) erroneous emanations notwithstanding.
It is not my goal here to rehearse these debates.39 But in the service of (the morally desirable practice of)
engaging in those assumptions that make things hardest for one’s own position, I want to assume here
that the latter group has the better of the argument, and that there is in fact no moral obligation—not
even prima facie—to obey a morally iniquitous law just because it is the law. Now even on this assump-
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tion, it remains an open question whether officials—Presidents, for example—have such an obligation even
if citizens do not. One possibility is that they do because of the oath they take, but we can let that pass here
because in our context the existence of an oath simply to obey the Constitution does not help us with the
question whether there is an obligation to obey the Supreme Court’s interpretations of the Constitution, a
dimension that is our central question but not part of the oath for any American public official.
Even without the oath, however, it may still be the case that officials have special obligations (Simmons
calls them “positional obligations,” and they bear some affinity to questions of role morality40 ) to the law
because of their special and voluntary roles. Maybe citizens have no obligation to obey the law qua law,
so the argument would go, because they cannot plausibly be understood to have genuinely consented or
entered into a voluntary social contract with their fellow citizens. But officials—like Presidents—are not
in the same position. They have voluntarily stood for office, and as such can be taken to have consented
to a wider range of obligations than have ordinary citizens.
But even if this is so, it is not entirely clear what presidents and other government officials have actually
consented to. They may have consented to obey the law, but they have not consented, typically, to obey
judicial interpretations of the law, and so for the moment let us assume simply that a President, for exam-
ple, has no obligation to obey a Supreme Court interpretation of the Constitution when that interpreta-
tion conflicts with what the President—who has also agreed to pursue the general welfare, and has agreed
to preserve and protect the Constitution—thinks is the morally best thing, all things considered, to do for
the population. We will return to the question whether the President actually does have an obligation to
follow judicial interpretations of the Constitution, but for now we will assume that, from the President’s
lights, he does not.
III
But what does it mean to say that the President has no obligation to obey Supreme Court interpretations
of the Constitution? It may mean that an unconstrained President should do what he or she thinks is
morally and constitutionally best, the Supreme Court notwithstanding, but it says nothing about the obli-
gations of those who create the environment—and the incentives – under which presidents function. To
put it differently, it does not follow from the fact that the President should do what he thinks best, all
things considered, that other officials and the population at large should let him do so. For if the
President’s lack of an obligation to subjugate his best all things considered judgment, or even his best
constitutional judgment, to that of others flows from his moral autonomy as much as from his role, then
the moral autonomy of the public just as plainly requires that the public not subjugate its best all-things-
considered judgment to others, including the President.41
In the context of the immediate discussion, the implication is that a President’s lack of his own obliga-
tion to follow Supreme Court interpretations he believes constitutionally and/or morally erroneous says
little about the way in which the decision-making environment should be designed, and little about the
extent to which the designers—the public, and all of the other institutions create the framework of incen-
tives and obligations and goals that inform public decision-making—might well put in place a series of
incentives designed to prevent a President from doing what he from his lights has a moral and constitu-
tional obligation to do. If you in the exercise of your autonomy were to plan to engage in acts that I in the
exercise of my own autonomy believed were likely to cause injuries to third parties, then I in the exercise
of my autonomy would, from my perspective, have good reason to try to prevent you from exercising your
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autonomy just as you, in the exercise of your autonomy, would have good reason to try to prevent me from
doing so.42 To say that a President is not from his perspective obligated to follow Supreme Court prece-
dents thus tells us little about whether it would be a good thing from a larger perspective to put in place
mechanisms and incentives that would attempt to prevent the President from engaging in his own
unconstrained but potentially erroneous moral and constitutional judgment.
This asymmetry of authority, in which the illegitimacy of authori-
ty from the perspective of the President does not entail the illegit-
imacy of that authority from the perspective of the authority, is
especially applicable to the question of the authority, or not, of
Supreme Court interpretations of the Constitution. In many
respects the point of a written constitution is to impose second-
order constraints on first-order policy preferences. Although one
purpose of a constitution is to prevent bad leaders from doing bad
things in the service of their own misguided or power-enhancing
goals, another purpose is to prevent good leaders from doing first-
order good things that have bad second-order consequences.43
State governors and state legislatures, for example, are constitu-
tionally prohibited from protecting their own industries from out-
of-state competition not because only an evil governor or legislator
would wish to do such a thing, but because well-meaning gover-
nors and legislatures appropriately focusing on their own constituents will collectively damage the
national economy. And the point is even clearer with respect to individual rights. Not all (or even most)
of the government officials who restrict freedom of speech and press are self-aggrandizing despots who
seek to stifle criticism. More commonly, such officials seek in good faith to achieve genuine short-term
good (think of the officials who in 1978 sought to keep the Nazis from marching in Skokie, Illinois), or
the officials now who with good cause and good faith wish to restrict the advocacy of terrorism or the dis-
tribution of plans for manufacturing explosive devices—but at the expense of even more important and
enduring long-term values. Much the same can be said of the rights of those charged with crimes, some
dimensions of equality rights, some dimensions of the constraints on permissible punishment, and
many more. In all of these cases the Constitution serves not to keep bad leaders from doing bad things,
but instead keeps good leaders from taking good short-term or first-order actions in the service of even
better (or more fragile) long-term or second-order values.
Once we see that much about the Constitution—and indeed much about law in general—is about impos-
ing constraints on the well-intentioned, public-serving, and short-term beneficial actions of people in gen-
eral and leaders in particular, it follows that some mechanism is necessary to ensure that such second-order
constraints can be effectively enforced. And although in theory leaders could enforce second-order con-
straints on their own sound first-order policies, in practice, especially given political incentives, this is
highly unlikely. Consequently, one way of thinking about the Supreme Court as an authoritative inter-
preter of the Constitution is as the external institution necessary to enforce second-order constraints
effectively. If it is indeed the case that enforcing such constraints on one’s self—doing what seems to be
the wrong thing now in the service of larger or longer-term values—is systematically difficult, then
authoritative Supreme Court interpretation of the Constitution may be the best mechanism we have for
giving genuine bite to American constitutional law.
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“Although one purpose of a consti-
tution is to prevent bad leaders 
from doing bad things in the service 
of their own misguided or power-
enhancing goals, another purpose is 
to prevent good leaders from doing 
first-order good things that have 
bad second-order consequences.”
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Seeing authoritative judicial interpretation—judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation, as it is
often put—in this way does not presuppose a grandiose picture of the Supreme Court or its individual
members. The Justices of the Court are no more imbued with wisdom or insight than Presidents, and
they are no more committed (but no less) to the genuine welfare than are Presidents or a host of other
public officials. And although the Justices do have life tenure, they are hardly immune from the pressures
of reputation or the desire for glory.44 What they do have, however, is their very externality, and the com-
parative advantage of the courts in constitutional interpretation is not in the judges’ greater wisdom but
in their greater distance. Just as we have inspectors general and departments of internal affairs to ensure
that officials do not have the conflict of interest inherent in investigating one’s self, so too do we have a
Supreme Court to provide the same kind of external and comparatively independent (at least of the polit-
ical pressures on elected officials) check on the natural—and, indeed, expected—pressures, goals, incen-
tives, and values of those officials who are expected to pursue policy and the immediate public welfare
first and foremost.
Just as this account of judicial interpretive authority does not presuppose an unrealistically grandiose pic-
ture of the capacities of the Justices of the Supreme Court, nor does it presuppose an unrealistically dim
view of the goals and motivations of elected and appointed officials. Elected officials typically desire re-elec-
tion, to be sure, but the good ones—and there are many—are also genuinely concerned about the public
good and about the prosperity in all respects of those whom they represent. But it is precisely the point that
even good-faith pursuit of these goals may conflict with the pursuit of those long-term goals that require
short-term or even long-term sacrifice of the general welfare. It is in those instances that external inter-
pretation and enforcement of constitutional values is most important, for it is in those cases that we have
the greatest reason to suspect that leaving such interpretation and enforcement to even the most public-
spirited and public-focused of public officials will likely over an aggregate of instances be ineffective.
IV
It does not follow from the above that Lincoln, Roosevelt, Reagan (through Meese) and most other
Presidents have been mistaken—from their lights—in claiming the authority to interpret the Constitution.
Nor does it follow that Roger Toussaint, Fawn Hall, Arthur Sulzberger, Ray Nagin, and countless other
non-President public leaders have been mistaken—from their lights—in interposing their own moral
and constitutional views between the courts (or the law) and their ultimate actions. But let there be no
mistake about the implications of that claim. Presidents and other officials and leaders who have made
such a claim are claiming—in actuality even if not in theory—the authority to interpret the Constitution
in a way consistent with their own policy goals and their own conception of morality in a world of moral
disagreement, and in a way consistent with what they perceive to be the short- and intermediate-term
moral and policy goals of the population at large. An example from Congress is instructive. For the past
two decades we have seen an increasingly acrimonious and increasingly salient debate about campaign
finance reform, a debate that has both policy and constitutional dimensions. In terms of policy one side
claims that money is distorting politics, and that legislative action is necessary to limit campaign contri-
butions and campaign expenditures, and consequently to limit the effect of wealth on political choices
and official behavior. And the other side claims that large campaign contributions essentially represent
the aggregation of smaller interests in a way that reflects rather than distorts democracy, that campaign
contributions are a good measure of preference intensity, and that governmental restriction of campaign
contributions and expenditures would be dominated by partisan interests.
139
S
H
O
U
L
D
O
F
F
IC
IA
L
S
O
B
E
Y
T
H
E
L
A
W
?
In addition to this policy debate, there is a constitutional debate, in which it could plausibly be argued, as
the Supreme Court has45 —to oversimplify—held, that restrictions on campaign contributions and expen-
ditures amount to a restriction on political speech in violation of one of the core values of the First
Amendment. And on the other side it could also be plausibly be argued either that money is not speech
and that restrictions on campaign finance do not even implicate the First Amendment, or that, even if
the First Amendment is implicated, the compelling interest in integrity and equality in elections is just
the kind of interest that could outweigh the First Amendment. 
Given that there are two different policy positions and two different constitutional positions, there are
thus four possible combinations of constitutional and policy views on the issue of campaign finance
reform. In theory a person could believe that campaign finance restrictions are both constitutionally 
permissible and advisable as a matter of policy, are constitutionally permissible but unwise policy (just
like lowering the speed limits on interstate highways to forty-five or increasing the salaries of members
of Congress to $800,000 per year), are wise policy but constitutionally impermissible (like allowing 
one-house legislative vetoes46 or prohibiting the distribution of virtual child pornography47 ), or are both
unwise policy and constitutionally impermissible (like enforcing racial segregation in the public schools
or establishing an official national religion). 
Yet although there are four possible combinations of policy and constitutional views, it is telling that at
no time in the past two decades has any member of Congress taken either the second or third view men-
tioned above. Every member of Congress who believes that campaign finance reform is unwise policy has
also insisted that it violates the First Amendment, and every member of Congress who believes that such
reform is sound policy has also argued that such a policy would not violate the First Amendment. The
combined number of members of Congress who in their public statements have said that campaign
finance reform is constitutionally permissible but unwise as a matter of policy or wise as a matter of pol-
icy but unconstitutional is zero. 
The lesson from this should be clear. When allowed to offer their own opinions about constitutionality,
members of Congress almost invariably interpret the Constitution to align with their policy and political
views, and we have no reason to believe that Presidents and countless other public officials do or would
behave otherwise. If allowed to claim their own authority to interpret the linguistically (and historically)
indeterminate provisions of the Constitution, Presidents and elected and appointed officials can be
expected to interpret the limitations on federal (and executive) power, the requirements of separation of
powers, and the constraints of freedom of speech, freedom of religion, due process, equality, and many
others in ways that not-so-coincidentally happen to align with their own constitutionally-unconstrained
policy and political preferences. So even though public officials have good reason from their perspective
to behave in just this way, there exist even stronger reasons from the perspective of constitutional gover-
nance not to permit them to do so. Official interpretive authority is thus asymmetric, because from the
perspective of an official it would be wrong to cede the power to interpret the Constitution, but from the
perspective of the Constitution it would be wrong to allow an official, and perhaps especially the
President, to claim just the kind of authority that from the official’s perspective it would be right to claim.
V
The question is now transformed. There is a strong case that public officials should obey the Constitution
even if there is not a strong case, by hypothesis, that public officials should believe in their heart of hearts
that public officials should obey the Constitution. And thus the issue is one of designing an incentive
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system to impose upon public officials an obligation to obey the law, because any approach other than
imposition is almost certainly destined to failure, as current controversies about the President and nation-
al security make so clear.
But even this may be too easy. Those who would enforce such an incentive system on public officials are,
in the final analysis, the public, and thus the real question is one of whether the public, any more than a
President or any more than members of Congress or any more than police officers, can be expected to
impose and enforce second-order constraints on their own first-order policy and political preferences.
And if this seems unlikely, even more unlikely than for elected officials, then one way to think about judi-
cial interpretive supremacy is as an almost fortuitous feature of the American constitutional culture that
would be unlikely to be ratified popularly today but which turns out to have highly desirable conse-
quences.   
Yet we are a long way from recognizing this feature of American constitutional practice. Consider, for
example, the controversy during the 1988 presidential campaign regarding Michael Dukakis’s veto, while
Governor of Massachusetts, of a bill that would have compelled all teachers in the state to lead the Pledge
of Allegiance on a daily basis.48 Relying on an advisory opinion issued by the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court49, and on the United States Supreme Court case of West Virginia Board of Education v.
Barnette150, Governor Dukakis explained his veto in terms of constitutional (and judicial) compulsion, an
explanation widely hooted down as a major political gaffe.51
Viewing Dukakis’s explanation as a political mistake, however, merely reinforces the view that neither the
law as law nor the Constitution as the Constitution has very much purchase in presidential or political
decision-making. For some this is a good thing. But if it is a good thing, then we can see that much of
the rhetoric about official obligation to the law and to the Constitution is hollow. And thus much of the
criticism of President Bush for violating the law—as opposed to doing the wrong thing—is hollow as
well. But if it is instead a bad thing that the law as law means so little in political debate and public and
political decision-making, then we have a long way to go before we as a nation have recognized that the
Constitution operates as a genuine constraint on even the best of immediately desirable decisions. In
order to get there, it would be necessary to create a political environment in which reliance on Supreme
Court interpretations of the law and of the Constitution, even by people who disagree with those inter-
pretations, is no longer considered foolish. But until we are there, grandiloquent statements about pres-
idential obligations to the Constitution and to the law should be perceived as shallow rhetoric with little
effect on actual official decision-making. 
Note
This paper was first presented at the Conference on Presidential Leadership at the Jepson School of Leadership
Studies, University of Richmond, on September 9-10, 2005, and then to the American Constitution Society at
the Yale Law School on February 9, 2006. Audience comments on both occasions have helped immeasurably.
Research support was generously provided by the Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public
Policy, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, and by the Center for Public Leadership,
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.  
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